Nothing, we believe, presents so fair a field for economical analysis, even in this age of new lights, as the subject of colonization. . . . So grateful to our national pride has been the spectacle, that we have never paused to inquire if our interests were advanced by so much nominal greatness.
[~ichard Cobden, England, Ireland and America, 1835.] All the advantages claimed for the mother country are for the most part illusions . . . . A colonial policy for us would be just like the silken sables of Polish noble families who have no shirts. tBismarck, 1868 and 1871.] Relations between Italy and Abyssinia have for many years been on a satisfactory footing, and it is Italy's . interest that Abyssinia should remain an independent state and increase in prosperity and civilization.
[Luigi Villari, The Expansion of Italy, 1930, p. 51.] We are faced to-day with the necessity of creating an Empire. [Lavoro Fascista, June 20, 1935 .1 I T HE Have-nots are clam.ouring that they are "people~ with~ut s~ace," and ar~. disturbing the world wlth the1r clatms for expanston. Germany is arming; Italy is fighting; Japan, having done the immediately necessary :fighting, is digesting her gains, and steadily, though less spectacularly, absorbing more. The Haves are counter-arming, with growing anxiety.
The Haves are disturbed in more than their peace and comfort; they are disturbed in their consciences too. They ask themselves whether it is possible or sensible to sit on the safety-valve; but they also ask themselves whether it is fair for them, with their great colonial possessions, to ignore these claims of the Have-nots, and to apply sanctions to Italy when she seeks "a little corner in the sun." Surely it is as natural that the Have-nots should be "dynamic, as that the Haves should be "static." The rich, in every national society, have had to make enormous concessions. Must not the rich in the international -society do the same? Is it not clear, on every considera-tion of conscience as well as of common sense, that the Haves must pay the price of peace ? 1 England, the most conspicuously endowed and most envied· of the Haves, has agreed that the question should be considered, and has said that she is ready to consider it. It becomes, therefore, a practical question. It rna y closely affect Canada. Her immense territory, rich in natural resources and inhabited by only eleven millions, makes her prominent among the Haves. Undoubtedly, if the I-laves are to pay a price for peace, Canada will be expected to con tribute.
The Have-nots make it plain that they feel a grievance, and equally plain that their grievance endangers peace.
But it is not so plain that the Haves can remedy this grievance, or even that they ought to try; nor is it at all ·plain ·what kind of re1nedy would be effective. Least of all is it plain that the remedy lies in some sort of colonial concessions. All these questions depend on the nature of the grievance-whether it is rna terial, political, or psychological. What, really, . do the Have-nots want, and why do they want it? It is extremely difficult to ·answer this question, and i1npossible to answer it with certainty. Yet in all ordinary _ business-dealings the first obligation of anyone asserting claims against another is to state his claims definitely. \Vhat is equally important, if he vvants his claims considered, is that he must state them exhaustively, since clain1s in themselves reasonable may fairly be thought unreasonable if their satisfaction is to be made a steppingstone to further claims.
So far, the Have-nots have not thus stated their claims, still less indicated what assurances they are· willing to give that if these clai1ns are settled they will not claim more. No one knows ·what Gern1any wants, or what Italy wants, or ·what Japan wants. Months of laborious and sympathetic inquiry have failed· to elicit from Signor lVIussolini any clear statement even of what he wants in Ethiopia. The n1o1nent a way of satisfying one of his claims is suggested, another claim is put forward. This failure of the Have-nots to define their claims seems to be of controlling importance in the whole discussion, to constitute a strong objection to the clai1ns the1nselves, and to go far to justify the Haves in maintaining a negative and defensive attitude towards them.
The difficulty of determining what the Have-nets want, and why they want it, is not least acute in the case of their colonial claims. Ac~ording to Mussolini's various declarations, Italy is attacking Ethiopia-because she wants (I) revenge and/or punishment-to resettle accounts,'~ ·(2) defence and security, (3) to spread civilization, (4) roo1n for her surplus population, (5) wealth, (6) power, (7) prestige, and (8) to "fulfil her historic mission." As no addition has been made to this list for some time, we may treat it, provisionally, as exhaustive. We may also treat it as typical, since substantially similar lists can be compiled from German and Japanese sources.
Moreover, the fact that all the items are put forward, and that first one and then another is specially insisted on, suggests that the Have-nots will not be content until they are all satisfied.
Yet the most casual i.nspection of the list discloses i terns which the Haves, as such, are under no sort of duty to satisfy. Prudence or self-interest may counsel either concessions upon these items or resolute res1stance .to them; justice has nothing to do with i' t. In national societies, justice requires every possible provision for the material well-being and spiritual satisfaction of the less favoured; it does not require tha.t they. should all be raised to the peerage. Similarly I should say, broadly, that in the international society justice requires the Haves to make all reasonable concessions to the desire of the Have-nots for greater material well-being and for a fair share 1n any altruistic work that the Haves may be doing in other countries. But I should deny that) apart from this, there is any duty whatever upon the Haves .to help the Have-nots to becon1e, in the conventional sense, great powers; indeed, it 1nay be their duty in some circumstances under the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, and it may obviously be in their interests, to oppose them.
If this principle of division be sound, there are only three items in the list-(3)) (4), and (5)-which justice requires the Haves to consider. Revenge they are under a duty to prevent. The needs of defence and security will always be alleged by any aggressor; and Italy refused to discuss suggestions for securing her in East Africa, on the ground that she must be the sole judge of her requirements. The Have-nots ostentatiously decline any system of collective security because it cramps them in the pursuit of their other ambitions.
The desire for a larger share in the work of spreading -civilization can probably be satisfied in proportion, roughly speaking, as it is disinterested. Something has already been done in admitting Italians and Germans in to the medical and educational services in the Mandated Territories, but any form ofjoint or collective mandate seems un· workable. Still, the Haves could hardly refuse with a good grace to consider this claitn; they have talked too much in the past about the white man's burden in connection with their own activities in backward countries. But it may be doubted whether the civilizing motive is either pri1nary or entirely pure, and whether its satisfaction would content the Have-nots. I am not convinced that Japan is in Ma.l!-'. <;huria solely to hunt bandits. Italy, too, has still a good deal of civilizing to do in her present colonies. I believe that this motive is a strong element in public opinion about colonies, but rather for retaining than for acquiring them. In states, as distinct fron1 individuals, it rarely extends beyond the area of political control. The Have-nots couple a claim to control with their claim to civilize; and there is force in the observation that "there is no record of any stronger nation ever having felt called upon to civilize any people whose soil did not hold valuable natural resources." 2 The two chief claims that may be put on gro"unds of justice are the claims to room for surplus population and to colonies as a source of wealth. If it appears upon examination that colonies would neither relieve the population-pressure of the Have-nots nor make them any richer, we may fairly conclude that th~ claim for colonies is really made for other reasons, and that the Haves will be justified in so treating it. For the sake of clearness, it will be necessary to discuss separately the population aspect and the economic aspect of colonies. But in practice the two cannot be separated, since the numbers that a colony can absorb depend on economic, as well as on physical, conditions. II vVhen we tum to over-population as a basis for a claim upon the Haves, we are met at once by the objection that Italy and Germany are stimulating their populations by every sort of inducement and pressure, while Japan is apparently doing nothing to limit hers. It is hard to see how the Flave-nots can base any fair claim upon a condition ·which they are the1nselves deliberately creating or permitting; and there is reason to suspect that the condi--tion is being created to serve as a basis for the claimand for other clai1ns as well. It is by no means certain, either, . that any of these countries has in fact succeeded in over-populating itself. Over-population does not depend simply on co1npara tive densities. The question is really one of adjustment between population and resources. It may be as true to say of a country that it is economically under-developed or lopsidedly developed as that it is over-populated;
1 and the phenomena of over-population may sometimes be produced or cured, without any change in density, by changes in 111 ln the home country itself !Italy] . . . it may roughly be estimated that the exploi tacion of the whole area of 1and available will provide a means of livelihood at home for a population larger by 17,72 millions than the present one" (Attilio Oblath, "Italian Emigration and Colonization Policy," International Labour ReoiewJ June, 1931, XXIII, pp. 805 jf.).
economic policy or shifts in international trade.
If, however, we admit excessive population in all three countries, and overlook the causes of it, the first remedy that will occur to anyone, and especially to any Canadian, is that some of the Haves might adopt a more generous im1nigration policy. The self-governing Do1ninions; the United States, the South American countries, have narrowed their doors. Should they not offer to widen· them again? There is no doubt about Italy's answ·er to such an offer. It would be "No," with Fascist scorn. "The Fascist idea is that a large and growing population is an asset and not a handicap." 2 Mussolini explains why: "Sirs, Italy, to count as anything, must arrive on the threshold of the second half of this century with a population not inferior to sixty million inhabitants."
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In 1927 and rg28 the Fascist government gave legislative effect to these views by forbidding permanent emigration except in special cases~ and even encouraging repatriation. 4 Three quotations will show how useless it would be to offer Italy facilities for emigration:
We as Fascists must have the cout·age to declare that emigration is an evil when, as at present) it is directed towards countries under foreign sovereignty. Emigration is necessary, but towards Italian countries and possessions .... Why should our race form a kind of human reservoir for the replenishment of the small or declining populations of other nations? Why should our mothers continue to bring into tl~e world children who will grow up into soldiers for other nations? Fascism will cease to encourage emigration~ which sap~ the vital f~rces of race and state. 6 The Prefects should make it clear to all the authorities that 2 L. Villari, The Expansion of Italy, London, 1930 , p. 43. a May 26, 1927 . 4 Most of these provisions have been suspended since August, 19.30, on account of the depression, but Mussolini has made it clear that the essential policy is unchanged.
6 Signor Grandi in the Chamber, March 31, 1927 (Bolletino dell' Emigrazione, 1927 .
those Provinces which succeed in keeping all their sons at home, to work for the national development and defence, will have deserved w17ll of their country . 6 You wil1 no longer work the ground, no longer grow the fruit, no longer make the roads, no longer build the houses for others. If there should be no room for you in Italy, I will give you another Italy beyond the seas.' Germany, probably, would give the same answer, though she has not, so far as I know, officially said so. The ideas of her present government on this subject are much the same as Italy's, and for the same reasons; and Herr Hitler's own views are clear from Mein Kampf.
I doubt whether there is much truth in the suggestion that is sometimes made that these views are a consequence of the closing of doors, and would soon be changed if the Haves opened them again. But suppose that they do open them, and that the immigrants come. Suppose that Canada, as a first instalment of her contribution to the price of peace, admits to-1norrow Ioo,ooo Italians or Germans or Japanese; what will happen to them? Shall we send the1n west to increase our unsold wheat crop? Shall they build us so1ne more railways? Or shall they join the rest of the unemployed in the towns? So it would be everywhere. What would really happen would be that they would not co1ne, at any rate after the letters from the first batch had reached home.
The curious fact is that, with the single exception of Ireland, emigration, however ~xtensive, has always been ·accompanied by a gro,vth in the home population. It has never proved more than a temporary palliative for a country's population problems. And the idea that it could prove more in the cases we are discussing appears fantastic when we look at the surpluses to be provided for.
During the last few years the average annual excess of births over deaths has been 912,ooo in Japan (1929 ( -33), 432,ooo in Italy (1930 , and 307,000 in Germany (I9JO-J).
Even more fantastic is the idea that an adequate outlet would be provided by colonies. Colonies may provide an outlet for pride, but not for population. In 1913 the German colonies had an area more than five times that of Germany, and Germany had owned most of them for some thirty years. Yet their total white population was only 28,846, of whom about ro,ooo were non-Gennans. More Germans emigrated in I 9 I 3 to the United States alone, and there were several non-German cities in which more Germans were then earning their living than were to be found in the whole German colonial empire. France's colonies, with twenty times the area of France, have a white population of about one and a quarter millionsless than three years' increase in the I tali an population; while the white population of the Dutch colonies is about one-half of this increase for a single year. Italy has had her East African colonies for about fifty years and Libya for 1nore than twenty. Their total Italian population is about 4o,ooo, of whom less than 1o,ooo are on the land. 8 Italy and Germany say that their present or former colonies are not suitable for white settlement. This may be true; but the contemporary propaganda for their acquisition represented them as eminently suitable, just as Ethiopia is being represented to Italians to-day. There is no better way of deflating both the "demographic" and the economic basis of thes. e colonial claims than to read 8 Villari (op. cit., p. 87) says: "But even if .•• not more than 200,000
Italians can settle in the colony, or 100,000, it will always be a large and compact mass of Italians residin_g on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and will greatly strengthen Italy's position and prestige both from the strategic and political point of view" [my italics].
the German colonial propaganda of the seven ties and eighties 9 and the Italian propaganda in favour of taking Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya, to compare them with the almost exactly similar outpourings of to-day, and to contrast them with the actual results. "The easiest solution," says Signor Villari airily,I 0 "would be for Italy to acquire colonies suitable for white settlers." VVhere are there such colonies? If England offered Italy the choice of all her colonial possessions, which would Signor Villari choose? Kenya, probably, would be the most suitable. After forty years, it has a white population of less than 2o,ooo. Multiply by twenty to allow for the lower requiren1ents of the Southern. I tali an labourer, and still you hav:e · barely a year of Italy's increase. Yet England is an experienced colonizer; sh~ has vastly more capital to spare for development than Italy; her 'home population is twice as dense, and she has two million unemployed.
At any rate, suitable or not, this is the only sort of terri tory that is conceivably in question. It is a cool enough proposal, in the circutnstances, that the I-Iaves should hand over any of their colonies. . But it would need more than the triple brass of a ll10dern dictator to suggest that any of them should give up part of her home territory to serve as a breeding-ground for his cannonfodder.
Finally, since we are discussing the price of peace, it is material to ask whether, if some means were found to relieve the population-pressure of the Have..,nots, they would forgo their ambitions of .expansion and settle down peaceably at home. There is no reason to think so. 
III
The econo1nic claim-the clain1 to colonies as a source of wealth-is put mainly on the ground of easier and more assured access to (a) raw materials and (b) markets. At the back of it lies the idea, about which something must be said later, of self-sufficiency in time of war. \Ve should keep in mind throughout how small a part colonies, in any proper sense of the word, can in the nature of things play in this question, and how much smaller a part they actually do play. With far the greater and richer part of the world the Have-nots deal on precisely the same terms as the Haves. Any advantages enjoyed in this part by any of the Haves is due either to causes (such as geographical position or special aptitudes) which are largely independent of human action, or to some bargain which was not the result of any sort of political · ownership or control by the Have concerned over the other party. This is obvious; but it is not so obvious to -the average Have-not citizen that this open part of the world includes the greater part of what he knows collectively as the British Empire. He does not distinguish between self-governing Domin-ions, Crown Colonies, Pro-tectorates, and Mandates. How should he? They are all red on the map. Try to convince him that England does not in some way "exploit" Canada-indeed, that it is sometimes rather the other way round. He simply thinks that you are "tnaking British propaganda." Stili less does he know how · far India controls her own tariffs and currency. Thus his rulers, who do know, easily arouse. in him the desired response by talking, with suitable vagueness, about "England rich in colonies."
Even· as to colonies properly so called, there are one or two points to be noted. Some of what used to be Turkish possessions, and the larger and economically more important part of the former German colonies, are administered under mandates which require the mandatory to ensure complete economic, commercial, and industrial opportunity to the nationals of all other members of the League. A great belt right across Central Africa is covered by treaties providing for the Open Door. Japan has the benefit of these treaties, and Italy can have it whenever she chooses to ratify; Germany would have it now if she had adhered when she was a mem her of the League, and could get it if she again became a member. advanced countries as a group profit by the exploitatio'n and development of the more backward ones. It is whether it is economically better for a given country to acquire and develop colonies of it~ own or to iet some other country do it.
On the debit side of the account, the governing country has, besides the cost of acquisition, all the overhead expense, which includes the whole cost of administration and defence and most of the cost of development. This overhead expense is not negligible. The subsidies paid by Germany to meet deficits in her colonial budgets for the thirty years 1884-1914 amounted to 867.5 million marks; in the last five of these years, in spite of a rapid increase in the trade of the colonies, the subsidies were · st.ill averaging 30 million marks a year; and the colonies must cert~inly be charged with part of the cost of the German navy. A like story can be told of other colonial empires. 2 Japan's empire has been, and is, an enormous strain on her finances, and it is still an open question whether they will crack under it. If Italy's colonial balance-sheet to date were that of a private enterprise, no court would refuse a winding-up order.
Does the governing country get its money's worth? Even .in Open Door or Mandated Territory it has certain advantages, and it usually gets the largest share of the trade. But it is easy to exaggerate its advantages; and 2 The deficits in Belgium's colonial budget for the five years 1931-5 averaged 17 5 million francs a year, though the budget for 1935 includes 165 million of "extraordinary" revenue; the total colonial debt is 3,785 million francs. Holland's annual colonial deficits for the three years 1933-5 averaged 82 million. guilders, and her funded colonial debt is 1,215 million guilders.
It is doubtful whether these figures show the whole expense. The net charge on the French treasury for colonies during the years 1926-32 show_ed an average annual increase of 240 million francs and averaged 1,618 millio,n francs a year; in the last of these years it was 2,403 million francs-about 20 per cent. of the gross value of the trade in that year between France and her colonies.
part-generally a large part-of its share of the trade it would get anyway if it wanted it. So far, at any rate, the mandatories have lost money, and any power taking over a mandate would have to hold it on the same terms.
Colonial propagandists like to express the benefits to the governing country in absolute figures; they look more impressive so. But in view of the point at issue, such figures-mean little. The question is what proportion of the governing country's total external trade is with its colonies, and what proportion it gets of the total external trade of those colonies. The rest goes to other countries, while it alone bears the cost of acquisition and the overhead expense. In the years 1910-3 Germany's trade with her 'colonies was about 0.5 per cent. of her own external trade, and she got 40 per cent. of the external trade of her colonies. For Holland in I 928 the. corresponding proportions were 6. 5 per cent. and less than · I 2 per cent.; and her colonies did not help her much in the depression, ·for in I 933 the proportions were 3. 5 per cent. and 13 per cent. Belgiu1n in the two years 192.7-8 got 46 per cent. of the external trade of Belgian Congo, but this was only just over 2. per cent. of her own external trade. · By 1933 Belgium,s share had risen to 67 per cent.>-but the total to be shared had fallen by 65 per cent. 3 The objection that these are all Open Door colonies is largely irrelevant, since most of the colonies that Germany or Italy could hope to get from the Haves are also Open Door, either because they form part of the Conven tiona! Congo Basin or because they are held under mandates. Let us, however, without going through the com plica ted intermediate gradation of colonial preferences turn for a moment to the other extreme. France has pursued the policy of "assimilating,, her colonies to her own tariff-system; economically, these assimilated C<?lonies form part of France. Only about roper cent. of France's imported raw tnaterials came from her colonies. During the depression, the ratio of France's colonial trade to her total external trade has risen sharply, reaching 27 percent. in I 933, and probably more now; but this has not been due . to any increase in colonial trade, · which has declined, but to the huge decrease in the total external trade of France. Moreover, in the two years 1932-3, though she got over 50 per cent.
of her imported food-products from her colonies, she got from them only 6 per cent. of her imported raw rna terials. With the possible exceptions of wines and spirits from North Africa and about half her imported fish, it does not appear that France gets any of her imports from her colonies cheaper than she could get them either elsewhere or from the same territories if some other country owned them. 4 Paris, 1925) , taking as his criterion the interests of the French taxpayer, reaches a rather similar conclusio_ n.
All this leaves still unto~ched the question: What part of this colonial trade is really attributable to political ownership of the colonies? The question is vital, since the part that the governing country could have got' in any event is irrelevant. Unfortunately_, no accurate answer is possible. Evidently the answer would vary widely in different cases_, and even in any specific case would be largely guesswork. But the amount of trading that is done with other people's colonies, and the high proportion of the trade of a given country often enjoyed by another without any political connection between · them, suggest that, if an accurate estimate could be made, the :figures already given would look even less impressive than they do.
On a broader view, these colonial trade statistics show how strong is the tendency of economic benefits from colonial development by any one country to spread to "all nations integrated in the world's trading regime." 6 Discrin1inatory tariffs and the like are of limited efficacy in checking thip tendency. Moreover, a!tempts to retain an abnormal share of colonial trade prove economically injurious to the governing country; and they are apt to cause unrest (and con sequent rise in the cost of administration and defence) in the colonies. The facts also indicate that, if Sir Samuel Hoare is right in thinking that the real basis of the grievance of the I-Iave-nots is 'ithe fear of monopoly-of the withholding of essential raw materiaJs," it should be possible to satisfy them. It does not appear that there is any present danger of such monopoly, or any reason why the Haves should not give adequate guarantees against it.
It seems, therefore, that in this field there is a good deal to be said for the policy of letting George do it. Especially for the Have-nots, if their motives were primarily economic, this would appear to be the sound policy. They have ryo capital to spare for the business of extensive colonial development, which requires large immediate outlay and brings slow returns. They need all they have a't h01ne. If Italy or Germany embarked on this business, it isreasonably certain that, far from raising the standard of living at home, they would lower it for at least a generation. The Have-nots, · and particularly Germany, answer that most of these objections to owning colonies yourself are beside the mark for them. To tell us, they say, that · the countries with raw n1aterials are only too anxious to sell them to anyone who will buy, and that the trade of most of the world is open to us on the same terms as to the Haves, is like telling a man with no money that he is perfectly free to go shopping. Colonial open doors are of little use to us. For everything that we buy abroad we must pay in gold, of which we have none to spare, or in foreign currency, which we can get only by selling· ~ur goods abroad. Thus we can in1port o~ly to the extent that we can export; and tariffs, quotas, and the like, not simply in colonies but everywhere, are making exports more and m~re difficult for us. Just in so far, therefore, as we could trade with our own colonies in our own money, we should be better off.
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Even if we accept this argument at its face value, it does not support an economic claim to colonial ownership. The volume of trade with any colonies that Germany or Italy can hope to acquire by peaceable means (the cost of war rules out for this purpose all others) would make hardly any difference. And what saving it did make in gold and foreign exchange would not compensate the overhead expense, 1nentioned above, which would be necessary to obtain that saving; for there is a limit to the outlay even of paper marks that can be justified economically by the saving of each gold mark~ The figures already given make this fairly plain. Current experience . confirms it. Currencies have not proved notably more solid, or the balance of payments easier, in countries with colonies than in those without. The special difficulties of Germany and Italy are not due in any appreciable degree to lack of colonies, but largely to their own economic policies; and they are remediable, so far as they are remediable at all without a change in those policies, not by acquisition of colonies, but only by greater freedom of world-trade.
I think that there is a more funda1nen tal reason why colonies ·would do little to satisfy the material needs of the Have-nots. They cotnplain that they came too late to the feast, when all the best helpings were gone. But they are too late now in a different sense. The helpings are not what they used to be; the best days of imperialism are past. Owing partly to an awakened public conscience and partly to an aroused native consciousness, there are limi. ts now to the crude gutting of a colony, using the natives as tools. Besides, you now want the colony not . only as a source of raw materials, but as a market. You must therefore "raise up the natives to the point where they have gotten purchasing power.'.'' You must pay 7 1 owe this pleasing phrase to a former president of the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce. Addressing President Calles of Mexico at a reception by the Chamber, he said: "Sir, you have done the noblest work that God entrusts to mortal man. You have raised up ten million people to the point where they have gotten purchasing power." The idea is made more vivid by Major H. A. them decent wages and educate them to wider desires. But, as you do that, two things are .likely to happen. You increase· the cost of your raw materials; and you arouse in the natives other than immediate material desires. They begin to want to buy their needs in the cheapest market and sell their products in the dearest (neither of which may be yours), and, generally, more and more to manage their own affairs. It becomes increasingly difficult and expensive to prevent them from doing so. Your economic ''ownership" of your colony becomes le~s and less substantial, and probably, though more slowly, your political ownership as well. This dilem1na has always been inherent in modern imperialism, but formerly the imperialist powers had a longer and more profitable run for their money than they can get now.
In truth, this whole econo1nic argument for owning colonies seems to me to n1isread the colonial history of the last seventy-five years. Modern colonial expansion, in its economic aspect, has been rather a· result of riches than of poverty-a symptom of prosperity rather than a cause.
IV
At this stage, two questions naturally suggest themselves. Since the I-Iaves cling to their colonies, and seem -or at any rate seemed as lately as 1919-as anxious as ever to acquire more, must there not be something wrong about the argument that colonies do not pay? If, on the · other hand, the argument is right, ought not the Haves to be the more willing to relinquish some of their colonial possessions to the Have-nots? They may know them Chisholm, Canadian trade commissioner to Cuba, in a report on Mexico as a Field for Exports, Ottawa, 1921 : "The simplest of its inhabitants will begin to purchase . . . agricultural machinery . . . preserves, cheap decorative articles, and musical instruments, gramophones, etc."
to be an expensive form of ostentation, but if the I-Iavenots want them and would be kept quiet by themJ why not? The point of these questions is a little blunted, though it is not turned) by three considerations. Many of the current economic ideas about coloniesJ as of those about war, are survivals from a time when, though not wholly true, they were much nearer the truth than they are to-day. As so often happens, the facts have changed faster than the ideas. Secondly, though colonies do not pay the governing country) they may pay individual, and in:fluen tial, elements in it. The main i te1ns of cost are distributed pro rata among the governing population; the profits are not. In short, there are vested interests. Thirdly, even for the governing country as a whole there are obvious purely material reasons against relinquishing colonies, which are no reasons at all for acquiring them. I shall risk the jeers of the hard-boiled persons who call themselves realists, and add that, in my belief, some of the I-Iaves would be deterred from handing over son1e · of their colonies by concern for the ·welfare of the native inhabitants. I know that profession~ of this concern are an old ·story, and that they have too often in the past been belied by conduct. Perhaps the change is an illustration of Mr. Spender's remark that men tend in the long run to live up to their hypocrisies. It may be (though I do not think so) that the views, of the "insiders" have not changed, but that public opinion has come to take their repeated professions at their face value and to insist that they be fulfilled. Certainly the mandates system and the work of the Mandates Commission have had an influence far beyond their own sphere .. Whatever the reasons, I believe that concern for the natives is now genuine and dominant to a degree that would have surprised the last generation; that it is becoming more so every year; and that it will present a serious obstacle to any scheme for redistribution of colonies. There is more in this than the natural feeling of each people that its own methods are best. The four leading colonial Haves are democratic countries, and it seems most unlikely that public opinion in these countries would tolerate the idea of turning over "our natives, to Fascists or Nazis. Still, these obstacles, even the last, might be overcome, and it might be difficult for the Haves-_ especially after 1919-to insist upon them, if they obstructed the paramount interest of peace. Nevertheless, even though the Haves can give no better reasons for wanting to keep their colonies than the Have-nots for wanting to acquire them, even though the reasons on both sides be substantially the same, and have nothing to do with civilization, -surplus population or communal economic; benefit, still it does not follow that the Haves should agree to aredistribution. That depends upon what the real reasons are. We have eliminated the only reasons that involve justice. But self-interest may still dictate that the Haves should retain their colonies; and broader considerations may raise grave doubts whether concessions now would really make perm anent peace more likely. It seems to me that that is in fact the position.
I do not believe that the high-placed proponents of the economic reasons for acquiring colonies have themselves any faith in them. It is, to my mind, incredible that Mussolini is trying to conquer Ethiopia, or that some Nazi leaders 1 want the German colonies back, on economic grounds. They use the economic argument, as they use the arguments about civilization and population, to tickle the ears of the groundlings who will have to pay. Their own motives are neither altruistic, nor "demographic," nor economic.
v The real reasons why the Have-nots want coloniesas also, in the main, why the Haves are reluctant to part with them-are power and prestige. They want to be strong and great. So high an authority as Professor Rappard 1 puts it thus: "Colonies . . . hardly pay any more nowadays; yet colonial ambition has not sensibly diminished. It seems that, to be a Great Power in the eyes of the world, it is not enough to have a large population, or great wealth, or even some big battleships. You must also have colonies. That, far more than alleged economic or demographic needs, is the reason why at least one Great Power now wants to re-constitute her colonial empire and another to enlarge hers." But he adds: "If that is the true ·explanation of the -origin of colonies-and I think it is the only sound one-.l it is not the ground upon which they are justified. Though the thirst for prestige still plays a considerable part-and almost always a sinister one-in the modern world, it can scarcely be invoked any longer in our democratic age [1932] to justify a policy of conquest." Considerations of power probably weigh more with the Haves than with the Have-nots. The Haves want garrisons and naval and air bases to protect their outlying possessions and their communications with them.
They think, too, of the threat which some of their colonies might constitute in the hands of some other power. To France, her colonies are also of great and growing importance as a source of man-power. For the Have-nots, the main object under this head seems to be self-sufficiency in time of war.
2
It is clear that for them 3 this object is economically unattainable. But vvhy in the name of "·realism" should the Haves contribute to the power of the Have-nots? And what would such a contribution have to do with the price of peace? Self-sufficiency in war is a desirable asset to a nation that wants to pursue a "dynamic" policy~ and a useful insurance against sanctions. So are battleships-and both minister to prestige as: well as to power; but it has not so far been suggested that the Haves should hand over part of their :fleets. Yet a claim to colonies for this purpose 1nigh t reasonably be accompanied by a request for warships, since selfsufficiency from colonies, even if economically possible, would be strategically illusory without com1nand of the sea.
The motive of prestige, on the other hand, is stronger with the Have-nots than with the Haves. Naturally, since they are the climbers-the Mrs. Initorr Dedd,s and the Mrs. O'Hellwyth Manners's-of international society. Almost all their propaganda about other motives, however literally their peoples swallow it, is either a conscious cloak for, or a rationalization of, this motive. Only three weeks before he attac~ed Ethiopi-a, Mussolini . said: "At heart I really care less for these material advances [housing, roads, etc.] And one fact stares us st;ubbornly in the face. In 1914 Germany was not over-populated. She combined, in a · degree to which neither she nor any other European power can reasonably aspire now, wealth, power, and prestige. Currencies were stable. International trade flowed, by compariso. n with tO-day, freely; and she was steadily increasing her share of it. She had her colonies, still largely undeveloped. She had, in short, everything that the Have-nots now claim, and more than they can fairly ~xpect to get. But the result was not peace. 6 VI Accordingly, if the Haves 1nake up their minds that they must attempt to meet in some way the grievances · of the Have-nots, their attempts are likely to be mistaken and futi~e unless they clearly recognize that these grievances ar. e not really economic, but political. Yet to make political concessions to them, now that Germany has her "equal status," would be probably useless and certainly wrong-useless because ambitions would be whetted rather than appeased, and wrong because the only hope of reasonable international relations lies in eliminating such ambitions. No nation has any inherent right to be a great power, or can win one by multiplying its population and its armaments and intoxicating its people. Any nation that seeks by such means to acquire a nuisancevalue must eX})ect to be treated as ·a nuisance; the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, as I understand them, 6 1 do not mean by this to beg any q~estions about the causes of, or responsibility for, the War, but simply to note the fact that, in the circumstances stated, war did happen. Those who attribute a primary resp~nsibility to Russia do 'not suggest that her main object was material prosperity. She was pursuing her historic mission of "protecting" Slavs and dominating the St~aits. Would material concessions have satisfied Serbia, or Austria-Hungarx? require that it should be so treated. In international society the gate-crasher must be :firmly discouraged.
It is not 1ny purpose to deny that some of the Havenots have legitimate political grievances. These legitimate grievances, however, lie rather in Europe than in the col9nies; nor are they confined to the great or the near-great among the Have-nots. A conception of justice which applies only to nations above a certain size holds no promise; no better international order can be created so long as the chance that grievances will get a hearing is proportionate to the force behind them. I do not seek, either, to belittle the economic troubles of the Have-nots. l\1y point in this article is that these troubles are not the true reason for the claims of the Have-nets to colonial possessions, and would not be alleviated, but rather aggravated, by concessions to these claims. For the rest, these troubles, too, are co1nmon to both small and great among the Have-nots-and to n1ost of the Haves as well. No doubt, a wider and more widespread opening of colonial doors would help. vVha t is really needed is a reversal of the policy (to which Gern1any and Italy have contributed their full share) of economic nationalis1n, so that world-trade as a whole may flow more freely.
Such a reversal is as little to be expected in the present temper of the nations (to which also the Have-nots are making their full contribution) as is a fair consideration of political grievances. Indeed, it seems to me extremely doubtful whether, in the interests of peace, it is even to be desired. Rather it seems fortunate that, while the collective organization of peace is still undeveloped, economic difficulties should be at least some check on political ambitions. To say that "parity in prosperity is the price of peace" is to put the cart before the horse, and to take small account of history. Peace otherwise assured may bring prosperity, but I see little reason to believe that prosperity will bring an assurance of peace.
Rather I apprehend that, if J eshuron waxes fat, he will kick harder than ever.
It follows that the first step in any settlement between Haves and Have-nots is to make it clear beyond hope of dispute that nothing is to be gained by violence. If, for the present, that can be done only by organizing overwhelming force against any aggressor, then, however reluctantly, the League must ·1nake this organization its first bus1ness. It is true that the League can have no hopeful future as a 1nere instrument for maintaining the privileges of the Haves. But neither can it as an agency for levying international blackmail.
It is useless to try to deal with people who base their claims on Historic Missions, Manifest Destinies, or the Glories of Imperial Rome; and dangerous to make concessions to such clai1ns. Not until it is plain that peaceful negotiation offers the only ptospect of concessions will it be wotth while to· negotiate, or ·will claims be stated definitely and exhaustively; and it should be a condition of any concessions that those receiving them should join the collective org_ anization of security. Then, and only then, will the Haves be able to pay the price of peace with a reasonable assurance of getting value for their money.
